Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Untouchability

Untouchability was not so much a sin as a calculated crime. But it is easier for everyone, even some victims, to treat it as a sin, for acceptance of moral culpability costs nothing.

The recent walkabout (padayatre) of Basavananda Maadara Channaiah Swamiji, head of a Dalit matha (gurupeetha) in Chitradurga, in a predominantly Brahmin-inhabited agrahara in Mysore, and the cordial, indeed reverential, welcome he received highlight the changing formal perceptions about the substance and practice of untouchability in Karnataka.

The Swamiji, by birth a Madiga, was received, according to media reports, with all the traditional honours given to heads of well-known Brahmin mathas. Photographs showed him having his feet washed (pada pooje) by women and men of the Brahmin community. During his walkabout, he was accompanied by large crowds of local residents.

This Brahmin-Dalit interaction has been initiated by Swami Vishvesha Theertha of Pejawar Matha, Udupi. Once a leading light of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, he has also been campaigning on the dangers that Hinduism, the Sanatana Dharma, is facing through conversions. Though proselytisation is not unique to the so-called monotheistic faiths, and Hinduism too has engaged in conversions (See, “A natural process of transformation,” The Hindu, November 7, 2008), the belief is widespread that Hinduism is peculiarly vulnerable because it is a non-proselytising faith, unlike Christianity and Islam, seen as engaged in a systematic campaign to draw people away from the Hindu fold. To counter conversions of Dalits into Christianity or Islam, Swami Vishvesha Theertha has undertaken such walkabouts in Dalit villages, more accurately described by their residents as ‘holegeri,' meaning localities inhabited by the holeya, the word itself meaning something that is dirty, besmirched, telling more about the reality of everyday life and experience of Dalits than these symbolic walkabouts.

Clearly, among traditional Hindu religious leaders there is awareness that the practice of untouchability is damaging the faith, driving Dalits away, and some alarm over its implications. Dalits who may (or may not) have at one time passively accepted the practice as part of the natural ordering of caste hierarchies of the varnashrama dharma, have been restive for generations. Along with several non-Brahmin castes, Dalits too are now establishing the so-called jathi mathas, headed by persons of their kind, bearing all the outward symbols and accoutrements of the heads of traditional Brahmin maths. Superficially, perhaps even in a fundamental sense, these mathas have appropriated all the visible symbols and the essential evils of Brahminism in practice. According to one scholar, there are at least a hundred such non-Brahmin mathas in Karnataka, most of which came up in the post-Emergency political churning of the State.

However, the correctives being applied, like demonstrative walkabouts by Brahmin leaders in areas one shunned as literally dirty and polluting , and by Dalit leaders in areas formally barred to Dalits, or the washing of the feet of a Dalit guru by Brahmins, are driven by a fundamentally flawed perspective that sees untouchability as a ‘sin.' Thus the symbolic atoning by those who provided the ideology, the ‘upper' caste Hindus like Brahmins — for it was the Brahmins who wrote the texts. These attempts to weld a common Dalit-Brahmin platform, united in symbolic acts of unity and togetherness, also make those Dalits who are going along with such a compact complicit in their historic diminishment and exclusion.

The problem with such gestures is that the practice of untouchability was not so much a sin as a calculated crime, part of a social structure constructed by those who controlled the resources to facilitate the accumulation of surplus and profits in the process of material production. However, it is easier and more comfortable to everyone, even some of the victims of that crime, to give untouchability the spin of being a ‘sin,' for acceptance of moral culpability costs nothing. If, on the other hand, one were to see the practice as a calculated crime for which one has to eventually pay, those who have perpetrated such crimes could, under a proper system of justice, be sent to prison.

Comparison with apartheid

A comparison with the practice of apartheid in South Africa which, despite historic and cultural differences, had remarkable similarities with the practice of untouchability in India will amplify the point made above. It should be noted that although formally apartheid — an elaborate system of separation of races on the basis of colour covering every aspect of life in South Africa, from the womb to the tomb and even beyond — was legislated by the Nationalist Party government in 1948, the ideology itself went back to the very beginnings of colonial occupation; and the policy of racial discrimination was introduced by the English settler regime, long before the Afrikaner settler regime perfected it and implemented it in toto.

In apartheid South Africa, apartheid was the norm for the minority of whites, barring honourable exceptions who went to the trenches and paid with their lives fighting against it. However, when democratic South Africa was faced with the task of tackling its tormented past, it created through legislation a structure and an instrument called Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was tasked to establish, to the extent possible, the ‘truth' about South Africa's apartheid past and enable the ‘reconciliation' between the victims and perpetrators of the apartheid system. According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chair of the TRC and the principal driver of the process, all South Africans were victims of the system, even those who were part of successive apartheid regimes. “We are a deeply wounded people, we all need to be healed,” was one of his frequent observations.

The overwhelming majority of the victims did not buy into this approach. For them, apartheid was an instrument devised and contrived to make the majority of South Africans un-persons in the country of their birth, a necessary tool to keep the production process on, but with no rights to have a share in the fruits of their labour. However, when the time for reckoning came with the advent of a democratic government in April 1994, the instrument devised to take stock of the past, the TRC, chose to see apartheid as a ‘sin'; and when the criminality of the regime could not be ignored, this crime was enlarged to become “a crime against humanity,” for humanity's shoulders are broad enough to carry any crime, instead of a specific crime against the majority of South Africans punishable under the law.

This perspective is similar to the one that views untouchability as a ‘sin' for which those responsible for evolving its theory and implementing it must ‘atone' by “washing the feet” of the victims of the practice. Interestingly, one of the most feared flunkeys of the apartheid regime, Adrian Vlok, minister for law and order under P.W. Botha, who had tried to get Frank Chikane — a leading churchman opposed to apartheid from a Christian perspective — murdered by getting his underwear laced with poison, three years ago publicly apologised to Chikane and, as an expression of remorse, “washed the feet” of his once-intended victim in his office in the Presidency, where Chikane was Director-General.

To say that apartheid and untouchability by their policy of exclusion and diminishment deny equal rights to the majority of the people is to state the obvious. The question is: Why? Why did they do it? To explain the practice as a moral sin against god and man is to take the easy way out. On the contrary, if one were to see these practices as crimes, one has to seek a more rational explanation. These practices deny their victims equal rights and practise exclusion because only thus can those who practice untouchability and apartheid ensure a permanent, cheap, virtually free supply of labour, which the minority can exploit to enrich itself.

Put simply, the ideological foundation of apartheid and untouchability was economic, not any perversely conceived and articulated “divinely ordained moral law.” If one were to view these practices as a ‘sin,' the road leads directly to feet washing, public embrace, eating together and all that. In the era of the allegedly free and globalised markets, the most casteist and racist of persons will gladly shake hands, embrace, and share food with those who deep down they despise if this huge reserve of virtually free labour were to be available on tap. Only this explains the eagerness with which the Hindutva forces are embracing, actually initiating, these meaningless gestures.

If, on the other hand, one were to see untouchability as a crime, not merely in a legal sense which it is, but as part of an arrangement to ensure the continued enrichment of a minority, one can see such gestures as feet-washing for what they are — a theatre of high moralism and low, calculated cunning.

Kashmir needs a political package

Any further delay in addressing the situation politically will lead to increasing schisms within the Kashmiri body politic.

The most significant implication of this week's visit by an all-party delegation to Jammu and Kashmir is this: the Indian political class has collectively accepted the essentially political nature of the Kashmir problem. However, the benefits of the beginning of this much-awaited transformation of Kashmir from a ‘securitised' narrative to a ‘politicised' one will be short-lived if those reassuring words are not translated into actions. The Hindu's editorial (September 14, 2010) accurately summed up the United Progressive Alliance government's current approach to the Kashmir issue and the urgent need to move beyond mere words: “By talking big while having little to offer, New Delhi has unwittingly fanned the flames in J&K.” Hence, the need now is to announce a clearly defined ‘political package' for the agitating Kashmiris.

The all-party delegation cannot decide on such a political package; the Government of India can. But the more than hundred Kashmiris killed in recent months by the security forces have failed to prompt the Central government to think beyond its usual pious platitudes of dialogues, engagements and delegations. If New Delhi is determined to live forever in ignorance and denial, why should Kashmiris respond with anything other than cynicism to its out-dated and bumbling efforts towards what it likes to call ‘finding a solution'? New Delhi's complete lack of vision, seriousness and sincerity in previous dialogues with Kashmiris has understandably meant that the proposal is simply seen as a short-term tactic aimed to calm the situation. Once national and international attention wanes, and the Kashmiri protesters go about their normal lives, the government might go back, as it has done in the past, to the business of conveniently ignoring that thorny little issue in northwestern India.

Beyond platitudes

What, then, can be done to bring peace to the Valley? Can we, under the prevailing circumstances, lay out a clear roadmap for a political resolution of the Kashmir issue? The very fact that a political package is being contemplated as opposed to an improvised military strategy in order to address a political problem is itself encouraging. But there is a need to flesh out what it really entails. A long and drawn-out process of political dialogue without any time-bound commitments is unlikely to be accepted by Kashmiris; so the first step is to articulate a timeframe. A political solution to the Kashmir issue can be imagined as a multi-phased one, with measures relating to it being implemented in the immediate term, the intermediate term, and the long term.

Immediate measures

In the immediate term, the government should put together a panel of senior Kashmir interlocutors. They should be asked to talk to a cross-section of Kashmiris, most importantly leaders of all dissident groups, in a sustained manner. The government should immediately review the status and consider releasing all political prisoners arrested under the draconian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, or AFSPA, and such other laws. The AFSPA should then be suitably amended or withdrawn. There also has to be a rethinking on the Disturbed Areas Act and the Public Safety Act. Thereafter, an empowered judicial commission should be tasked to probe all fake encounters and civilian deaths in J&K at the hands of the security forces. The commission must have a legal mandate to prosecute erring officers, both civilian and military.

Intermediate term

In the intermediate term, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) should be set up in the State to help Kashmiris come to terms with their past and to advance the cause of justice and reconciliation. Both India and Kashmir need to make peace with each other and with their complicated past. The TRC can consider bringing out a white paper on the commission and prosecution of human rights violations in J&K over the years. However, the most important aspect of this political package should be the adherence to Article 370 of the Constitution in letter and spirit. Article 370 has been chipped away by a succession of State governments with the collusion and at the behest of New Delhi. Most of the key features of the Article have been distorted or removed to such an extent that it is no longer recognisable. This is severely resented by Kashmiris. Indeed, the National Conference-appointed State Autonomy Committee had, in 1999, recommended that the President of India should strike down all orders that infringe on the 1950 Constitution (Application to J-K) Order, and the Delhi Agreement of 1952. This recommendation was not heeded by the then Bharatiya Janata Party-led government. It should be revisited at the earliest in conjunction with other recommendations from political parties such as the People's Democratic Party.

The BJP and many other weak-hearted nationalists have argued that giving special treatment to Kashmir will loosen India's control there, creating a domino effect. They argue that such actions would contravene the spirit of national integration. Yet multiple Indian States enjoy special provisions in varying measure and are still as much a part of the nation as any other. Moreover, as the Supreme Court clearly observed in its judgment in Khazan Chand vs the State of Jammu and Kashmir (1984), J&K “holds a special position in the constitutional set-up of our country.” The Supreme Court further stated that Article 370 is the basis for a constitutional relationship between the Indian Union and J&K State.

For the long term

A permanent solution to the Kashmir issue is unlikely to emerge without the involvement of Pakistan. In the longer term, therefore, there is a need to revisit the back-channel decisions reached by the two countries on Jammu and Kashmir that can be implemented in the State in consultation with the people of the State. Now that Pakistan has, at least theoretically, given up many of its puritanical and irredentist positions on Kashmir, India should capitalise on the opportunity to seek mutually agreeable positions on the issue. India should also encourage the establishment of enduring linkages across the Line of Control, consultative mechanisms, trade, and public interaction between the two sides of J&K. Various non-governmental initiatives must be encouraged to bring people from the two sides of the erstwhile princely state. People-to-people contact such as this should not be underrated: it can contribute immeasurably to resolving long-standing conflicts such as that in J&K.

Any further delay in addressing the situation politically will lead to increasing schisms within the Kashmiri body politic. For instance, over the last few years we have seen an encouraging and creative political debate and ideological shifts between the mainstream and the dissidents in Kashmir. The ongoing agitation could undo that process of finding the middle ground. More significantly, one of the major casualties of this ongoing agitation would be the mainstream political ideas and processes in Kashmir. The mainstream Kashmiri politicians are not ready to go to the people today because they are scared and unsure what their response would be. The danger in Kashmir today is that the more mainstream your politics, the more likely it is that you would be termed a gaddar (traitor) by the agitating Kashmiris. So even the moderate dissidents are forced to take extreme positions.

Engaging Kashmiris in a result-oriented and goal-driven manner as laid out here is indeed taking the road less travelled, a road that is not easy to take. And so, before New Delhi decides to discard suggestions such as this, it needs to ask itself what serves India's long-term national interests better: maintaining the violent, chaotic, ungovernable status quo in Kashmir through brute force and military might, or meeting the legitimate political aspirations of the Kashmiris and convincing them that they have a place in the idea of India?

(Happymon Jacob teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

Monday, September 27, 2010

Power, privilege, corruption, hypocrisy

There is nothing to be proud of India's ranking in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2009. The country ranked low also in the Bribe Payers Index among emerging economic giants.
There is nothing to be proud of India's ranking in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2009. The country ranked low also in the Bribe Payers Index among emerging economic giants. The use of public funds for private gain is common. The misuse of power, position and privilege is widespread. Corruption seems to be a fact that affects all sections of society.
Misappropriation of public funds and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth are clearly illegal. However, subtler forms of non-material corruption, coupled with abuse of power and misuse of privilege, are equally prevalent but not often debated.
Power corrupts: Lord Acton said: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This aphorism is widely acknowledged as true. William Pitt, the Elder, a British Prime Minister, echoed similar sentiments when he said “unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it.” Both seem to have based their observations on anecdotal evidence rather than formal research. The systematic enquiry and evaluation of evidence in social sciences were not standard in their times.
Corrupts absolutely: Recent research confirms Lord Acton's dictum that power corrupts. Contemporary research has focussed on issues related to power and on the state of powerfulness and powerlessness; on how power affects people's behaviour and thinking. The evidence suggests that people who believe that they deserve their power and position are morally pliable and more prone to abuse their privileges. Studies have documented that power and hypocrisy go hand in hand as the powerful feel a sense of entitlement; their sense of privilege become private law. The culture of entitlement results in double standards, one for themselves, their family and friends, and the other for the general population. Such use of divergent values and principles by the individuals involved results in hypocrisy. One could argue that corruption and hypocrisy are the price society pays for being led by the privileged.
Power attracts: Anecdotal evidence also suggests that power attracts the corruptible. This may be particularly true when systems are steeped in or breed corruption. If organisational structures provide greater and illegitimate influence with the rise in status within institutional hierarchies, then loftier titles and higher ranks mean illicit power. Power will attract those who seek to use and misuse such licence for their own ends.
Power and corruption seem to have a complex and bidirectional relationship. In societies which accept corruption as part of life, power appears to attract the corrupt and those in power encourage corruption. These associations seem to work on the whole, with exceptions proving the rule.
Privilege empowers: Even a cursory analysis of the powerful clearly documents the fact that privilege is almost always the route to power. Privileged education, in private schools, provides the platform for future unassailable confidence, disarming sincerity, captivating charm and understated authority. It also makes for articulate and confident individuals with high self-esteem. The combination of parental aspirations, family resources and excellent education lays a firm foundation for later success. Children's levels of achievement are usually closely linked to their parents' background. The privileged background of many elected representatives also argues that many advantages are inherited rather than inherent.
Spectrum of corruption: Corruption in its broadest sense is not restricted to financial irregularities. The abuse of religion, language, ethnicity, kinship, privilege and position also comes under this rubric. Such misuse is also a form of moral fraud. However, these may be in the form of “softer” violations which, though equally fraudulent, are much more difficult to recognise, quantify, track and document. While moral corruption may be universal, it tends to spread like wildfire when it is accepted as the norm at the top of an organisational hierarchy and within institutions and populations.
Conflicts of interest: It is widely recognised that related and unrelated interests can, directly or indirectly, influence decision-making; specific interests can prejudice appraisals and consequently bias judgments. It is always good policy that interests are declared and conflicts evaluated in people who are entrusted with impartial decision-making. The presence of conflicts of interest is independent of any execution of impropriety. Many organisations now mandate that such financial and other interests be declared prior to appointments to decision-making bodies. Removal, disclosure, recusal and third-party evaluations are different methods of managing them.
Individuals and systems: Power and privilege are usually institutionalised and are part of systems and organisations. Organisational support for unaccountable power often causes individuals who occupy top positions to fail to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate use of such power and privilege. The line between these is often very fine, with many individuals unable to see the difference. Even honest individuals may unquestionably accept their positions and consequent power without realising its impact on their functioning. Their intelligence, diligence, strategic planning and hard work to reach the higher echelons of their organisation may propel them to believe that their position and privilege are well deserved. Such feelings of entitlement often result in double standards and consequent hypocrisy. Even the most scrupulous people can be caught in such situations when they come up with ill-conceived schemes and proposals, or when they want to rigidly maintain status quo, despite evidence of a need for change.
The corruptible actively seek power to enhance their position and privileges, and in pursuit of more unaccountable authority. Systems, which encourage corruption and which have normalised illegitimate power, support such people's sense of entitlement, thus furthering their original aims of acquiring public power for private gain.
Corruption and India: While no society is free from corruption, what is worrying is that such behaviour appears normalised in India. The licence raj of the past did not help. Capitalism, globalisation and liberalisation have also increased the pressure to succeed, achieve targets and acquire wealth quickly. The abuse of public power, office and resources for personal gain is common. A culture, which declares conflicts of interests and institutes systems to assess them, is rare and yet to take hold in India.
No organisation is immune to the abuse of power. The intense desire to leave lasting legacies and to make significant changes in institutional direction and function often result in decision-makers short-circuiting standard procedures. The culture of sycophancy, common in our culture and society, aids and abets in such corruption. Double standards in public life are accepted; hypocrisy is tolerated and is the norm.
The way forward
We need to focus on power and highlight the abuse of privileges. Corruption does not necessarily imply financial fraud. All of us need to examine ourselves as individuals to identify, minimise and eliminate double standards and hypocrisy. We need to audit our systems and institutions to change the culture, which breeds such corruption. The task is to identify power, which comes with position, to recognise conflicts of interest and to detect feelings of entitlement, which turn the privilege of office into private law. The struggle is not a one-time affair in the lives of individuals, systems and communities but a constant quest, a journey. Society should allow for greater social mobility for wider social participation and greater equality.
There is need to re-examine our culture, which has normalised corruption in its many different forms. We in India need to acknowledge the need for introspection on our acceptance of the abuse of power. The “Seven Nolan Principles of Public Life” — selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership by example — should form the standards for holding public office. There should be regular and independent reviews of individual and organisational functioning. The challenge is to inspire and change individuals and to transcend and transform societal norms.
(K.S. Jacob is Professor of Psychiatry at the Christian Medical College, Vellore.)

Right to Information Act

Five years after the enactment of the Right to Information Act, awareness of the law, its provisions and potential appears to be very low.
Marking the completion of five years, in September 2010, of the enactment of the Right to Information Act, the Central Information Commission (CIC) held the fifth annual convention on “RTI: Challenges and Opportunities,” in New Delhi on September 13 and 14. It was largely a gathering of Information Commissioners from the States and the Centre.
The five technical sessions had presentations by Commissioners and other experts. I had actively taken part in the earlier four annual conventions organised by the CIC more or less on similar lines. Six things stood out at this latest meeting.
First, the key leadership role played by Wajahat Habibullah, as the Chief Information Commissioner, in ushering in the RTI regime was acknowledged and he was credited for ensuring the independent standing of the Commissions.
A second outcome was that the fact that Section 4 of the RTI Act has not received the kind of attention it deserves in order to sustain the right to information regime — Mr. Habibullah himself has highlighted this aspect more than once — was echoed on both the days, but no specific suggestions emerged. Governments at the Centre and in the States need to do more in this regard than what the Information Commissions themselves could do.
Third, most participants reiterated that awareness about the Act, its provisions and potential was very low, and that more serious efforts are required. Also, efforts to sensitise the functionaries concerned were not good enough.
A fourth and more sensitive question that became evident during the deliberations was who, between the Commissions and civil society, has taken the Act to the people and are responsible for prompting the imagination of the people. Surprisingly, the divide in this regard was open. The Commissioners ought to have acknowledged the active role played by civil society and reiterated the need to work together even more in the future. The keynote speaker and other speakers expressed their concern about certain “belligerent tendencies” on the part of individual activists. Such isolated instances should not weaken the critical role played by civil society groups on this front.
Threats to activists
Fifth, the convention expressed concern over threats that some activists faced in the course of their work and condemned the killing of certain RTI activists that have occurred. In this context, Union Minister for Law and Justice M. Veerappa Moily, who inaugurated the convention, confirmed that the Union Cabinet was determined to bring forward the whistleblowers bill [‘The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons making the Disclosure Bill, 2010'] in the coming session of Parliament.
Sixth, the delay in disposing of applications and the backlog in the process that the Commissions are confronted with was yet another issue that was deliberated upon. But no options or alternatives came up. It was agreed that the RTI Act had kept the bureaucracy on its toes. But a general view was that the pile-up of applications was caused by the fact that the government and its agencies were not forthcoming in providing information promptly. One of the sessions dwelt on how the judiciary, the subordinate judiciary in particular, was largely apathetic and non-cooperative in responding to RTI petitions.
According to a PTI news report, the Minister who inaugurated the event said “RTI should not be a casualty of corrupt bureaucrats.” Shailesh Gandhi, a proactive Central Information Commissioner with the distinction of having been an RTI activist himself in Maharashtra before becoming Commissioner, said later in his presentation that the RTI Act need to be guarded from three potential threats — from the government, the judicial processes and the Commissions themselves.
Mr. Gandhi wanted Information Commissions to take an initiative on issues with wide-ranging and long-term implications: it would be too late to do anything if the Commissions have to wait. He himself had asked the Delhi government to put all its contract agreements concerning consultancy arrangements for the Commonwealth Games in the public domain within a week.
Gajendra Haldea of the Planning Commission, in a presentation on the Public-Private Partnership model, theorised that 20 years from now a third of the land in India would be in the hands of a few private corporates, going by the manner in which Special Economic Zone agreements were being entered into (with public scrutiny).
Mrinal Pande, chairperson of the Prasar Bharati Board, wanted the media to be brought under the preview of the RTI Act. (This was a suggestion that this writer had made at the second annual convention in 2007 and has been advocating since then, without success.)
The session should have deliberated on the media's role and acknowledged the sustained interest taken by some media outlets such as the Telugu newspaper Eenadu and NDTV, and the difference they have made to the situation.
The convention failed to note that women in sufficient numbers are not taking advantage of the provisions of the RTI Act, or what steps could be taken to correct the situation. It also failed to look at why the academic community has not been taking a real interest in studying the impact of the RTI Act and in promoting it.
There was no evidence of annual reports of Information Commissions in these four years ever having been discussed in Parliament or in State Assemblies. How is it so? It should be examined how many Commissions could not come up with their annual reports and why even the annual reports that were available did not make any difference.
In his valedictory address, Minister of State in the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Sachin Pilot talked about the shift in the balance of power and the equitable growth that the RTI Act should strive for. He wanted the RTI movement to take advantage of communication technologies.
Conventions and sessions
The CIC has been holding annual conventions in Delhi as an “official programme,” attended mostly by Information Commissioners, their staff, one or two Ministers and bureaucrats. The participation of civil society representatives has been marginal: those who did come were mostly from the National Capital Region. There has not been any acknowledgement of the role of civil society organisations in taking the RTI movement forward. At all the five conventions in Delhi, access was controlled. The CIC, nevertheless, deserves praise for holding the conventions.
This writer had the opportunity to take part in all the five official CIC conventions held in New Delhi as well as in organising five Open House sessions on the RTI in Hyderabad. The Social Audit Council of Andhra Pradesh, comprising a group of civil society organisations and backed by CMS, has been holding annual Open House meetings over the last five years on the implementation of the RTI Act. These were open to anyone but were attended mostly by RTI activists from the districts. The deliberations were based on their presentations and insights to realise the potential of the Act. At least one activist from each district gave such a review. A couple of bureaucrats concerned with the implementation of the RTI Act were specially invited to the Open House. V.S. Ramadevi, former Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka, was the chief guest in 2006. Wajahat Habibullah, Shailesh Gandhi, C.D. Arha and freedom fighter Purshotham Rao were the chief guests in the subsequent years. The State Information Commissioners were invited to all the five events, although only one or two chose to attend. Each year the Open House sessions honoured activists, officers and mediapersons for their initiatives in taking the Act forward.
The Fifth Open House session in Hyderabad on August 23, 2010, came up with some specific suggestions on the threats against and the killing of activists. It decided to prepare a directory of activists district-wise, form a network of activists, create a website, start counselling centres in districts and launch a helpline.
The sixth convention in 2011 in New Delhi should be an Open House. The participants should be predominantly from civil society, and include academics and women's groups in particular.
(Dr. N. Bhaskara Rao is the Chairman of CMS based in New Delhi.)

Gender Equality

The concept of gender equality needs to be re-evaluated and reinterpreted. Gender parity has been reduced to a cliché. It has become so banal on account of overuse that we don't pause to ask what it really means. Let us be clear about one thing — men and women can never be perfect equals. Nature never intended them to be. Men cannot do all that women are capable of, women cannot perform all that men do.
Women are the gentle sex, not the weaker sex as it is commonly understood. Grace and beauty are typically feminine attributes just as physical prowess is a manly quality. A role reversal is neither possible nor desirable. What I am advocating is mutual appreciation of roles — a partnership which is not constrained by notions of superiority or inferiority, but one that takes into account the inherent strengths, weaknesses and limitations that nature has imposed upon the two sexes.
Nature has gifted women with the power to create and nurture a new life. Motherhood is a glorious privilege that has been denied to the menfolk. This life-creating quality alone is enough to make society and men treat women with respect and reverence.
I support women's right to pursue higher education and a career. At the same time, deriding marriage as slavery is not wise. The family is the basic stabilising unit of a progressive society. Twenty or twenty-one may be too early to marry, but 30 or 32 will be too late. Biology is harsh on women bearing children late in their life. Late marriages can play havoc with their reproductive systems. It is good neither for the mother nor the child. It is sensible for women to start a family by at least 25 or 26.
Teasing women in public is a perverse crime that has to be tackled in its various dimensions. A friend of mine who visited the USSR and Eastern Europe in the 1970s was shocked to find women moving around in the streets alone at midnight. An attitudinal change will be possible if we sensitise boys at an early age to the need to respect the opposite sex.
In our reluctance to implement a meaningful adolescent education, we end up perpetuating misconceptions and ignorance in the minds of boys and girls. Children should be taught about the need to appreciate and accommodate the natural gender differences. Sexualisation of films and literature is a dangerous trend. Filmmakers and writers have a responsibility to portray women in a responsible and respectful manner.
Doing the daily chores inside homes can be exacting and physically draining. I salute both housewives and working women who manage their homes without a murmur of compliant. As the lone male voice in the Open Page advocated, men should learn to share household chores to lessen the burden on the lady of the house whether she is working or not. If women go out to work, do shopping, pay utility bills, why can't the men at least share some of the domestic activities?
None of the articles spoke of the travails of the women belonging to the poorer sections. The sufferings of middle class women pale into insignificance when compared with the ordeal and hardships undergone by women on the lower strata of society. These women do not have the advantages of education and economic independence which their well endowed counterparts enjoy. Millions of women in villages, especially in northern and western India, experience widespread discrimination and prejudice on account of entrenched conservatism. It is these poor women who need the support of the government and society.
Gender equality is not about parity; it is about providing an equal and enabling environment for growth and prosperity for both sexes. The relationship between the sexes should be based on mutual respect for each other's role capabilities and sensibilities. Gender equality is passé, let us usher in gender partnership.

India and its neighbours

Instead of being alarmed at China's growing inroads in the region, India needs to take a harder look at its own role and find new ways to win neighbours and increase influence in the region's growth story.
No one would accuse Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of being alarmist. So when, addressing the Heads of Missions last month, he spoke of paying close attention to “global powers exercising influence in the Indian Ocean Region,” it was assumed that the Prime Minister was genuinely concerned about China's growing role in the region. When he spoke to editors some days later about his concerns on China again, the assumption was sealed.
India's growing concern rose from two factors — the first, Beijing's sudden decision to provide Northern GOC General Jaswal with a stapled visa, saying his command includes a ‘disputed' region; and the other, newspaper reports that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had approximately 11,000 soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan, digging tunnels and posing a direct threat to India across the LoC.
Diplomats on both sides now say they are ‘sorting out' the visa issue, with Beijing on the back foot, particularly given that General Jaswal has travelled to China in the past. Meanwhile, the reported build-up in PoK was aggressively denied by Beijing and Islamabad, both insisting that the troops are there to help contain flood damage, and the impending threat of the Hunza dam overflowing, and also to work on the Karakoram Highway project. India's suspicions that China's army is now securing its land route to the Arabian sea via PoK have nonetheless grown, given that China has also wrested control of the Gwadar port back from the Singaporean Port Authority. The development ties in with the fear of India being choked by a strategic “String of Pearls” — a U.S. Defence Department term for China's ambitions for bases in the Indian Ocean Region. With Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and the Sittwe port in Myanmar, it would seem the string is slowly turning into a choke-chain for India.
At one level, the fears of China overrunning Pakistan to open a front with India may seem far-fetched, even hysterical. At another, it may be a much needed wake-up call for India to reassess its preparedness to counter an increasingly assertive Chinese military. At an entirely different level, New Delhi's alarm in the past few weeks could be most constructive if it ensures that India takes a closer look at its own role in the region, and why China is making headway with so many of our neighbours.
Take Sri Lanka that has many reasons to welcome Indian investment. Whether it has been the tsunami, the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or the post-war demining and rehabilitation effort, Indian agencies have been at the forefront to help. And yet, as Sri Lanka recasts itself as the Singapore of the region, it is China that is its biggest infrastructural investor, bagging many coveted projects given China's deeper pockets. Much of it is a result of Indian apathy – the Hambantota port, for example, was offered to India first. New Delhi's lack of interest in developing this strategically located harbour was easily the gain of China, which worked double time to complete the project with $60 billion funded from China's Exim bank, building the port, the city centre, the airport, a stadium, and a massive convention centre. Many in India worry that Hambantota's future could include a Chinese naval base too.
While Indian concerns about Hambantota are well known, practically no one speaks of the port project that India does have, in the northern town of Kankesenthurai (KKS). Originally, after the tsunami, the project was handed to the Dutch, but after India showed interest, the Sri Lankan President tore up that contract and invited India to build the port. Yet 18 months later, this harbour near Jaffna has seen little by way of construction; even a feasibility survey taken in June 2010 has not yet been finalised. Meanwhile Hambantota will receive its first ship in November, some six months ahead of schedule. The contract for the Colombo port has just gone to a Chinese consortium — no Indian company having even tried to bid for it. Given that the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)-Sampur coal 500-MW plant is already delayed years beyond its 2011 deadline, it is hoped that other projects India has committed itself to including the northern rail line, the Palaly airport and the Jaffna stadium will be dealt with more expeditiously.
While many in India would see these projects essentially as aid to a needy neighbour, it is time to invert the prism and see them, just as we accuse China, as ways of increasing our footprint and extending our ambitions to a sphere of influence well beyond our land mass.
In January this year, a historic agreement with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina seemed to redefine how India would deal with its neighbours. Amongst a slew of agreements came India's $1-billion credit line — for 14 infrastructural projects. Even while the agreements were being finalised — Dhaka delivered some of the most wanted United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) militants. Despite opposition cries of a sell-out, Sheikh Hasina's India deal won her accolades in Bangladesh. Yet it took eight months before Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee flew to Bangladesh to operationalise the credit line, and by the time he reached, India had decided to change its earlier offer of $1bn at one per cent interest to 1.75 per cent — terms that took many in Dhaka by unpleasant surprise. Also, unless India relaxes its trade barriers to Bangladeshi goods, it will be accused of exploiting the transit rights only for its own benefit. It is hoped that Dr. Singh, whose trip to Dhaka is imminent, will address some of those concerns. Meanwhile China has moved into the delay gap on projects like the Chittagong port with ease, funding much of its refurbishment, as also the construction of the second Padma bridge, as it vigorously pushes MoUs on road links via Myanmar and a rail line connecting Beijing to Dhaka — as part of a $2.2-billion Chinese package on infrastructure.
A bolder move, but one that would win many hearts is to consider lifting tariff and non-tarrif barriers and duties unilaterally in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region altogether. Suspend the reality of our relations with Pakistan for a moment to think about the impact of ending such protectionism in a year that has so devastated Pakistan's economy. According to estimates, the destruction of standing crops on two million hectares has virtually wiped out Pakistan's staple revenue from export of cotton, rice, and sugar. The country will be dependent on importing these for the next few years. With 77 million people likely to go hungry, and Pakistan's projected growth likely to fall by half to about two per cent, it is only natural that China's interventions in flood relief, rebuilding destroyed roads, schools and bridges, aid and trade will grow. The question is: will India watch with its customary alarm but do nothing?
On our other frontiers, it must be said, the government has made some moves — increasing development aid to Afghanistan to $1.2 billion and discussing a $1-billion dollar credit line to Myanmar as well. Describing some of these initiatives at Harvard University this month, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said: “Today, with sustained high economic growth rates … India is in a better position to offer a significant stake to our neighbours in our own prosperity and growth.” It is equally important to stand that assumption on its head, and consider India's stake in the prosperity and growth of its neighbours. Whether it's Mauritius or Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan or yes, Pakistan — these are countries with close cultural, linguistic, historic ties to India no other country can match. As a result, it shouldn't be possible for China or any other superpower to encircle a country like India. The only thing that encircles us is our fear that they will.

Ayodhya: is a solution possible?

It should be clear to everyone, most of all to the judges who ordered the judgment deferred, that if the issue has defied a solution for a hundred years, no miracle is likely in less than a week.
The Supreme Court of India on September 23 gave a pause to the vexed Mandir-Masjid controversy and the contending title claims to the site made by the Muslim Waqf Board and the Hindu Dharam Sansad, by directing the Allahabad High Court to defer the pronouncement of the long-awaited judgment. Now, a three-judge bench headed by Chief Justice of India S.H. Kapadia is set to decide on the matter on September 28.
The learned judges of the Supreme Court, whatever their publicly stated positions, are not so naïve as to believe that within less than a week a solution could be found for the contentious case. It should be clear to everyone, most of all to the judges, that if the issue has defied a solution for more than a hundred years, no miracle is likely to happen within less than a week. All the water that has flowed down the Sarayu river through all these years has not helped Ayodhya to recover the meaning of its name — a place without war. On the contrary, the claims and counter-claims by the parties involved in the dispute have only helped to harden the respective positions, which have spread the hatred and distrust thus generated to the whole country.
Given these facts and the situation, what prompted the judges last week to grant a stay could not be the possibility of an imminent solution. They were probably trying to convey a message to the nation, particularly to those who are party to the dispute, as well as to the government. The case has dragged on for such a long time under the assumption that it could be resolved by the intervention of the judiciary. The court now seems to suggest that it is not the case; a real solution lies in the political domain, with the active participation of civil society.
The salience of the civil suit lies in the fact that it is implicated in the larger issue of the dispute pertaining to the Mandir and the Masjid on which the court cannot really pronounce a judgment, even if it gathered evidence from historians. The government was using the judiciary as an escape route. And the judiciary, instead of dismissing the case, attempted to overreach itself. As far as the civil suit for the title of the land is concerned, it was in fact decided in 1885-86. It was in the post-1857 period when political conditions were fluid that the mahant of Ayodhya constructed a chabutara on the land leading to the masjid and started worship, claiming it to be the janmasthan of Sri Ram. The mahant filed a case in 1885 claiming title to the land, but it was dismissed. So were his appeals to the superior courts. The British officials favoured the status quo, for religious and political reasons.
Record of aggression
The history of the Mandir-Masjid dispute during the post-Independence period is but a record of aggression by Hindu communal forces, and a series of compromises and reconciliation bids by the Central government led by the Indian National Congress, particularly under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.
In 1949, Hindu communal forces conducted a seven-day continuous recitation of Ramcharitamanas, which proved to be the precursor to the installation of an idol of Ram Lalla in the mosque. The fact that they got away with the defiance of the state not only emboldened them to indulge in further aggression, leading ultimately to the demolition of the Masjid. During this period, the Sangh Parivar not only organised a series of agitations to mobilise Hindus in the name of Ram but also made preparations for the construction of the temple. It assiduously built up a tempo of aggression, with Uma Bharti and Rithambara leading the charge. The finale of this carefully constructed aggression was the Rath Yatra led by Lal Krishna Advani 20 years ago, which finally led to the demolition of the Masjid in 1992. The demolition was a criminal act according to the laws of the country, as the mosque was a 400-year-old historical monument that the state was committed to protect.
While the Hindu communal forces were engaged in a progressive assault, the state was unable to solve its own political dilemma. The Congress which led the government during this period was committed to secularism in principle, but the party realised that it was not possible to survive without the electoral support of Hindus. As a consequence, the party indulged in secular rhetoric, but followed communal politics in practice. It pursued what has now come to be termed ‘soft Hindutva'. Through this means it hoped to outsmart the Hindu communal forces.
The leader who initiated this disastrous policy was Rajiv Gandhi. He ordered the opening of the locks of the Masjid, thereby permitting Hindus to perform puja inside. He did this in order to steal the thunder from the Hindu communal forces. His successor-Prime Minister pursued the policy of compromise much more vigorously, and ‘officially arranged' the shilanyas of the temple. The Congress thus became an appendage of communal forces; that is what emboldened a mob to demolish the Masjid, thus inflicting a major blow on democracy and secularism.
Decisive factor
The failure of the Indian state was a most decisive factor behind the act of demolition. As is evident from the account given later by Narasimha Rao, it is clear that the state failed to discharge its duty of protecting the monument. It failed to prevent Mr. Advani's Rath Yatra, which led to the loss of several lives: everybody knew it would have disastrous consequences. Even after the demolition, the construction of a temporary temple was not stopped. At least now the state can rectify its mistakes by charting out a bold and innovative step in line with the principles of secularism.
The parties to the dispute and those who indulged in violence in the name of Ram are not representatives of India's Hindus and Muslims. They have no authority to speak on behalf of Hindus and Muslims. They are actually seeking to coerce the members of these communities by claiming to speak on their behalf.

Food insecurity in urban India

Considerable sections of the urban population may face serious food insecurity even while the urban economy grows. There is a need for urgent action on this front.
Over the two decades of rapid growth of the Indian economy, the urban economy is generally perceived as having done very well. However, high urban economic growth need not by itself imply improved living standards for all urban residents. In particular, the recent and continuing phenomenon of rising food prices reminds us that considerable sections of the urban population may face serious food insecurity even while the urban economy grows rapidly.
Evidence from the National Sample Surveys of 1993-94, 1999-2000 and 2004-05, ably marshaled by the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS), has shown that the rate of growth of employment in urban India fell sharply between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 as compared to the period 1987-88 to 1993-94, but it picked up smartly in the period 1999-2000 to 2004-05. However, practically the entire growth of employment in this latter period was in informal work, and the quality of employment, as indicated by wage/income levels, insecurity, other conditions of work and coverage in terms of social protection, was extremely poor. This has serious implications for urban food insecurity, since a large segment of the urban working population is mostly without productive assets and relies primarily on wage or marginal self employment to survive. In other words, a large segment of the urban population faces food insecurity in terms of access to food. Such employment-linked food insecurity is especially severe in small and medium towns which have been largely bypassed in the urban growth that has occurred.
Rapid growth of the urban economy, largely unplanned, has also meant haphazard growth of urban centres and proliferation of urban slums lacking in basic amenities such as decent shelter, safe drinking water and toilets and sanitary facilities. This has implications for the absorption dimension of food security, since lack of safe drinking water and sanitation leads to poor biological utilisation of food and repeated episodes of morbidity.
A recently completed study of urban food insecurity explores these issues through an exercise of constructing an Index of urban food insecurity for the major States (M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai (2010), Report on the State of Food Insecurity in Urban India, being released in Delhi on September 25). Using several outcome indicators such as the incidence of anaemia and chronic energy deficiency among women in the fertile age group, and of anaemia and stunting/underweight among children below three years of age, as well as some input indicators such as the percentage of urban population without access to safe drinking water and that without access to toilets, the study shows that the period of economic reforms and high GDP growth has not seen an unambiguous improvement in urban food security across all States.
A comparison of the Index values for the periods 1998-2000 and 2004-06 suggests a rather modest improvement of the urban food security situation as measured by official data. But there should be a qualifying remark: that the data on access to safe drinking water and to toilets may in many cases overstate the actual access on the ground, in view of the reality of non-functioning or provision, or inadequate functioning or provision.
The overall marginal improvement in urban food security in India as measured by the composite Index in all its variants is accompanied by a significant improvement in the poorer States. The fact that the picture looks much less rosy when a purely outcomes-based measure is used suggests that there is no room for complacency on the issue of urban food security. If anything, it is disappointing that urban economic growth has made little dent on urban food insecurity.
While the poorer States have done better than before, they account for only a small part of the country's urban population. On the other hand, States such as Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Haryana, which are relatively more urbanised, have done poorly. This suggests that the food security situation may have worsened rather than improved for a sizeable segment of the urban population between 1998-2000 and 2004-06. Considering that urban inequality has worsened in the period since 1991, the implications for the food security status of the urban poor or slum-dwellers are worrying.
What can the government do to address the challenge of urban food security?
Points for Action
Expansion of productive and remunerative employment needs to be enabled through special assistance to the numerous small and tiny enterprises in the urban economy from credit to marketing support to infrastructure provision, along the lines suggested by the NCEUS. Based on an Urban Employment Guarantee Act, urban employment schemes can be designed and integrated in a synergistic manner with the need to improve urban amenities, especially in the small and medium towns.
Urgent action is needed to improve access to safe drinking water and to toilets. Special attention needs to be paid in this regard to small and medium towns which happen to be most poorly provided for in this respect.
Interventions in flagship programmes such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and other urban schemes should focus on the needs of small and medium towns and on the needs of slums in all cities, taking care to address the needs of the poor with regard to shelter, water, sanitation, drainage and nutrition education. Urban infrastructure cannot and must not mean only flyovers and six-lane roads in the metropolitan cities.
The urban Public Distribution System must be made universal. However, it is important to recognise that the PDS is only a part of a comprehensive food security strategy. Policy must address hidden hunger. It must also address the special needs of the vulnerable sections such as street children, orphans, HIV-AIDS patients and so on through such initiatives as community kitchens. Designing and implementing a nutrition literacy movement across all urban centres will also be worthwhile.
Promotion of urban and peri-urban agriculture, especially horticulture, can make a vital contribution to food and nutrition security. It can also be a source of sustainable livelihoods. Issues of governance in urban food and nutrition programmes need to be addressed through, among other things, democratic decentralisation and local body capacity-building.
Finally, urban food security is as much a matter of the fiscal policy framework as it is of programme implementation on the ground, and a precondition to achieve targeted outcomes is adequate outlays. Economic reforms therefore need to be ‘reformed' if inclusive urban development that addresses the needs of urban food security for all is to occur.

Reducing the risk of meltdown

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a group of regulators from 27 countries including the United States, reached an agreement on September 12 on a new set of norms — Basel III. Under it, banks will be required to significantly raise their capital adequacy levels thereby reducing the risk of another financial meltdown. The agreement more than doubles the amount of equity capital that banks must hold in relation to their assets. Apart from enhancing the requirement to 4.5 per cent of their assets from 2.5 per cent, it calls for the creation of a “conservation buffer” of 2.5 per cent that can be used in an emergency. However, in such an eventuality they will be forced to conserve capital by, for instance, halting dividends. There is also a third, optional rule — a counter-cyclical buffer that regulators can impose when credit is flowing freely. On top of all this, banks have to hold 1.5 per cent of capital, which may or may not be in the form of equity, as an additional margin of protection, should the first line of defence — the core equity reserves — be breached. Basel III has been welcomed around the world as a substantial improvement over Basel II. Particularly, its recognition of the role of counter-cyclical measures in times of both boom and bust is a valuable lesson learnt from the latest crisis.
However, there are weaknesses which banks are likely to exploit for reducing the levels of capital they have to set aside. There are no clear guidelines on how liquid assets are to be valued. The new rules are risk-weighted: the more speculative their investment the more the capital banks must set aside. The risk will be evaluated by the rating agencies whose track record was not at all impressive during the crisis. The new rules are to be brought into force in phases starting 2013 and so they will not be fully in place until 2018. Banks in India are sufficiently capitalised and are unlikely to need additional capital as they migrate to Basel III. However, their profitability might be curtailed as the implementation of the new norms would result in a lower leverage. Also, the dominant public sector banks that rely on perpetual debt instruments to shore up their Tier-I capital will have the challenging task of maintaining a minimum common equity of 7 per cent. Even without the new norms, a few leading government banks feel constrained in their efforts to raise resources through capital market equity offerings. The government's shareholding in them cannot fall below 51 per cent.

Niger neglected by the world

Aterrible famine has taken hold of Niger, despite warnings sounded almost a year ago by aid agencies and the United Nations. Nearly 12 million people, or about 80 per cent of the population, are now food insecure. In the four worst-affected provinces, one child in five is malnourished, and the country's Global Acute Malnutrition rate for under-fives has risen from 12.3 per cent to 16.7 per cent in a year. Comparisons have been made with the 1984 Ethiopian famine. Niger, for its part, is one of the poorest countries on the planet, and its Human Development Index is the lowest. It has the world's highest raw birth rate; on average, every woman has seven children, and 20 per cent of the children are unlikely to reach the age of five. Secondly, this year's drought, which followed the unusually heavy and destructive rain in 2009, has been a severe setback to the people's own success in reclaiming three million hectares of desert; in addition to destroying crops and killing cattle, it has wrecked the purchasing power of the 90 per cent of the population who depend on agriculture. Thirdly, neoliberal agriculture policies mean that Niger exports food to neighbouring countries. Unlike many other countries, Niger cannot import enough food to compensate for insufficient domestic production.
The international response to the famine has been slow and grudging. Donations so far amount to less than half the $348 million promised. The U.S., the U.K., and the EU have met their commitments, but several other states are yet to contribute. Some of the latter have lucrative uranium mining operations in Niger; those have, however, been criticised for causing radioactive contamination and related diseases. The news magazine Der Spiegel has called Niger the Saudi Arabia of uranium production, but ordinary citizens have hardly benefited from this industry. If there is anything good about the situation, it is that the military government which took over in a coup earlier this year is, unlike its civilian predecessor, not denying the problem. Given the country's poverty, sheer size (it covers nearly twice the area of Texas), and woeful infrastructure, the government cannot deal with the famine on its own. Unless the rest of the world responds much faster and more generously, Niger will continue to suffer what the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Food, Jean Ziegler, calls “silent mass murder.”

Elephants in India

The death of seven elephants in a train hit in West Bengal's Jalpaiguri district is a grim reminder that little has been done to stop such slaughter in various States. Assam and West Bengal account for two-thirds of elephant mortality in train hits, followed by Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, and Orissa. Only a month ago, a comprehensive report of the Elephant Task Force of the Ministry of Environment and Forests titled “Gajah: Securing the Future for Elephants in India” presented a road map to reduce elephant mortality in train accidents. Aided by extensive research, it identified key factors that raise the risk for the animals. These include dispersed water sources, steep embankments along rail tracks, sharp turnings, and sheer speed of trains. Scientists have empirically tested the evidence in Rajaji National Park, Uttarakhand, and achieved excellent results in saving elephants.
Overall, elephants may be doing better than tigers in India going by their estimated populations. But their long-term future depends on a science-based conservation plan. Gajah's historical range may have shrunk but the fact that 18 States host elephant populations making up an estimated national total of 26,000 (not counting the 3,500 in captivity) is cause for some optimism. Besides train hits, there are significant issues affecting conservation, such as human-elephant conflict, the diversion of land for mining and similar incompatible uses, the degradation of habitat, and the loss of forest cover. The Task Force is correct in its view that, given the magnitude of the task, it will take a statutory National Elephant Conservation Authority to address the problems. A virtue of the panel's report is that it is imbued with as much concern for communities as it is for the species. State governments should welcome the recommendation to substantially increase the allocations made for compensation to be paid to victims of conflicts. Agricultural losses suffered in elephant raids affect nearly half-a-million families annually. Enhanced financial compensation for such losses is a must. States that have the privilege of enabling elephant movement must also support the 32 existing and proposed elephant reserves, and secure the identified corridors used by the animals. Crucially, the Forest Conservation Act must be vigorously applied wherever diversion of land is proposed, and elephant habitat declared ecologically sensitive under the Environment (Protection) Act. Finally, why not make the Indian elephant the national heritage animal, as the Task Force recommends? This newspaper made it a centrepiece of its masthead, symbolising strength and power, many decades ago.

Monday, September 20, 2010

Dealing with India-Pakistan prisoners

Nothing could be more repulsive in modern-day diplomacy than a country arresting civilian nationals of another country and then cynically using them as bargaining chips in bilateral issues. Yet India and Pakistan have followed this egregious practice for decades. They have kept hundreds of people from the other side in their jails, releasing them only when it suits one or both governments, irrespective of when an individual prisoner completed his sentence. Some of these hapless cross-border prisoners end up spending as long as two decades in jail for offences such as smuggling, overstaying their visa, or crossing the border illegally. Almost all of them are poor; at the time of their arrest, some are not even aware of committing an offence. Clearly, the fishermen who regularly get arrested in the Arabian Sea for crossing the international boundary line do so only for livelihood reasons. An Ajmal Amir Kasab, caught while committing a terrorist offence, is rare on either side. In recent years, responding to the outrage among activists at this blatant violation of human rights, the two governments have made some attempts to tackle the “prisoners' issue,” as it is now known, but it is way down on their list of priorities. Fortunately, the judiciary in both countries has emerged as a counter-force on behalf of the prisoners. Commendably, the judges have taken non-nationalist positions and assessed the issue purely in terms of the universality of human rights. A few months ago, the Supreme Court of India ordered the release of a group of Pakistanis held in Indian jails well after they had completed their sentence. An intervention by the Pakistan Supreme Court last week led to the release of 442 Indian fishermen.
New Delhi responded by announcing the release of 31 Pakistani prisoners. But beyond implementing the court's orders, both governments must wake up to the need for a mechanism that can ensure humane treatment of a person from the other side who has been charged with committing an offence. The objective must be to send such people back as soon as possible, especially when the offences are minor. At present, there is a reluctance even to inform the other side of an arrest or grant the detainee access to a diplomatic representative of his country. The poor shape of bilateral relations cannot be an excuse for the present shabby treatment of these people. As a country that calls itself the world's largest democracy, India must take the lead in setting up a fast-track process for dealing with Pakistani prisoners without waiting to work it out reciprocally with Pakistan.

Building mobile health

Mobile wireless technologies have the potential to aid speedy disease detection, treatment, and monitoring in remote communities. When combined with the power of computers and special software, they can work in real time and enable interventions by health authorities to prevent communicable diseases from turning into epidemics. The experience gained from a two-year bio-surveillance programme in Tamil Nadu's Sivaganga district indicates that this elegant idea, of using mobile phones and computers to generate and analyse health data, can deliver good results. The project, led by the Rural Technology and Business Incubator of the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, and LIRNEasia, a Colombo-based ICT policy think tank, is worth studying as a model. Central to the initiative is a team of health workers, who used simple java-enabled mobile phones equipped with a custom application to record and transmit disease symptoms reported by patients. The combination of data and computer analysis mapped the disease patterns for health administrators who then worked on interventions. The Tamil Nadu trial, which will be scaled up to connect more secondary and tertiary care institutions, makes one thing clear: measurable public health benefits can flow if governments take greater interest in the emerging area of mHealth, or mobile health. In fact, the benefits can go beyond disease-tracking and extend to such areas as remote patient monitoring, health education, and creation of community-level health profiles.
With recent advances in wireless, governments can today launch mHealth initiatives in several countries, notably those with weak health infrastructures in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The platform is supported by the GSM Association, the umbrella organisation of the mobile communications industry, and by non-profit organisations such as the United Nations Foundation-Vodafone Foundation Technology Partnership. The mHealth initiatives undertaken so far also highlight the barriers to scaling up. Lack of good broadband mobile connectivity is the main obstacle. For India, the anticipated rollout of 3G and Wimax facilities should help resolve this problem, as should the fact that a number of States already have a broadband State-wide area network for exchange of data. There are major advances in public health and preventive medicine to be made with policy that is informed and empowered by a comprehensive mobile-enabled health database. For a complete picture to be available, private medical institutions, which cater to a large number of patients, should also be roped in.

Building mobile health

Mobile wireless technologies have the potential to aid speedy disease detection, treatment, and monitoring in remote communities. When combined with the power of computers and special software, they can work in real time and enable interventions by health authorities to prevent communicable diseases from turning into epidemics. The experience gained from a two-year bio-surveillance programme in Tamil Nadu's Sivaganga district indicates that this elegant idea, of using mobile phones and computers to generate and analyse health data, can deliver good results. The project, led by the Rural Technology and Business Incubator of the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, and LIRNEasia, a Colombo-based ICT policy think tank, is worth studying as a model. Central to the initiative is a team of health workers, who used simple java-enabled mobile phones equipped with a custom application to record and transmit disease symptoms reported by patients. The combination of data and computer analysis mapped the disease patterns for health administrators who then worked on interventions. The Tamil Nadu trial, which will be scaled up to connect more secondary and tertiary care institutions, makes one thing clear: measurable public health benefits can flow if governments take greater interest in the emerging area of mHealth, or mobile health. In fact, the benefits can go beyond disease-tracking and extend to such areas as remote patient monitoring, health education, and creation of community-level health profiles.
With recent advances in wireless, governments can today launch mHealth initiatives in several countries, notably those with weak health infrastructures in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The platform is supported by the GSM Association, the umbrella organisation of the mobile communications industry, and by non-profit organisations such as the United Nations Foundation-Vodafone Foundation Technology Partnership. The mHealth initiatives undertaken so far also highlight the barriers to scaling up. Lack of good broadband mobile connectivity is the main obstacle. For India, the anticipated rollout of 3G and Wimax facilities should help resolve this problem, as should the fact that a number of States already have a broadband State-wide area network for exchange of data. There are major advances in public health and preventive medicine to be made with policy that is informed and empowered by a comprehensive mobile-enabled health database. For a complete picture to be available, private medical institutions, which cater to a large number of patients, should also be roped in.

Turkey's 'yes' vote

The resounding 58 per cent ‘Yes' vote in Turkey's referendum on constitutional reforms marks a turning point in the history of a country trying to shed its image of a praetorian state. A secular democracy with a 99 per cent Muslim population, Turkey has long defied the stereotyping of Islam and its followers as being inherently incompatible with modern political systems. Paradoxically though, the military has had a massive influence on how the nation has evolved, partly because Mustapha Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, was himself a soldier. The military, which sees itself as the guardian of the Kemalist vision of a secular Turkey, staged four coups between 1960 and 2000, and has remained an influential political voice in the country, even drafting the 1982 Constitution. Among in the 26 amendments to which the people have given their assent are changes to make the military accountable to civilian power. The referendum itself was held on the 30th anniversary of the 1980 coup, and one amendment explicitly does away with the bar on prosecuting the generals who led it. The amendments also seek to curtail the judiciary, which has often acted as a limit on the powers of parliament, in tandem with the military. This radical reforms package comprises several measures to strengthen individual freedoms, and brings Turkey's Constitution closer in line with the European Union requirements for accession. Indeed, it may not have been possible to pull off such a package without the country's aspiration to join the EU.
What really complicates this referendum is that the political party steering the changes is rooted in political Islam. The ‘yes' vote is a political victory for the conservative Justice and Development party (AK), which has sought to change the Constitution from the time it first came to power in 2002. Its relations with the military and the Constitutional Court, the country's highest judicial body, have been strained, particularly over the government's attempts to remove the ban on women wearing headscarves in public institutions. The referendum victory is a personal boost for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of next year's parliamentary elections. Not surprisingly, it has raised concerns for Turkey's famed secularism. These fears formed the basis of the opposition campaign and led to 42 per cent voting against the changes. It is to be hoped that Prime Minister Erdogan and his government will use the referendum result in a way that will not detract from Turkey's standing as a modern secular and democratic nation of Muslims that can fulfill its role as a bridge between east and west in these troubled times.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Endangered Iraqi Heritage

The illegitimate war on Iraq has ravaged the country and severely eroded its capacity to manage not only its future but also the past. Despite timely cautions by archaeologists, the occupying troops irreparably damaged Iraq's heritage, some of which is more than 2,500 years old. Within a few days of the forces entering Baghdad, the looters ransacked the National Museum and stole about 15,000 priceless artefacts. (This was reminiscent of the grievous loss of heritage in Kuwait following Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion and occupation of 1990-91.) Post-invasion, the United States set up a military base atop the archaeological site of Babylon; the Polish troops dug trenches through an ancient temple; and American personnel damaged historic ruins to make way for a helipad. In the face of mounting criticism, the U.S. government tried to mend the situation by initiating the Iraq Cultural Heritage Project but its $13 million grant to the project is small change considering the loss inflicted. As the troops prepare to withdraw, the surviving parts of heritage stand exposed to further pillage. With a poorly funded and inadequately staffed antiquities police force (created in 2008) unable to offer adequate protection, illegal excavations and systematic looting of antiquities have resumed.
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (adopted by UNESCO in 1954) is meant legally to bind the state parties to protect the cultural properties during war and occupation. But it has hardly helped in Iraq. The United Kingdom, one of the two main aggressors, is yet to ratify the convention and the U.S. accepted it only in 2009, long after the invasion. Acceptance of it would have compelled these countries to integrate heritage protection in their invasion plans. This omission, as pointed out to the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry by 13 major heritage organisations, facilitated the extensive looting of priceless cultural heritage and contributed to the alienation of much of the Iraqi population. The reality is that the big powers responsible for damaging the Iraqi heritage will not be penalised — they can be held accountable morally and politically. From the standpoint of heritage protection, the lesson is this: when good sense fails, international and internal pressure is the only way to try and make countries behave decently. Parallel to this, the Hague Convention should be reviewed and the post-withdrawal obligations of occupying state parties expanded. It will be crucial to address the demand side by taking tough action against buyers of stolen antiquities, including museums.

Monday, September 13, 2010

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act

If the armed forces are going to be used within the country to deal with insurgencies and other serious internal disturbances, it is reasonable to expect that they must have the right to use force. But the requirements of democracy and even military discipline make it imperative that this right be exercised at all times and places in a lawful and reasonable manner. Regardless of what specific statutes may authorise, the use of force in both international and municipal law is considered reasonable only when it satisfies the twin tests of necessity and proportionality. It goes without saying that rules governing the use of force are meaningful only when there is some mechanism to ensure compliance. International law is often criticised for the absence of such a mechanism, especially when it comes to disciplining powerful states. But there is no excuse for civilised societies failing to take action when the laws that define what kind of violence is permissible are wilfully violated. By this yardstick, India is not doing well at all. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, which grants soldiers far-reaching powers to arrest and kill, has impunity scripted into it. In line with Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 6 of AFSPA prohibits the prosecution of a soldier accused of misusing its provisions unless the central government grants sanction.

In Kashmir, the Army brass has used this section to protect its men from going to trial even in incidents where they stand accused of heinous crimes such as the abduction and murder of unarmed civilians. In States like Manipur, so powerless have the civilian authorities become in the face of the Army presence that no one is even willing to take cognisance of serious crimes allegedly committed by soldiers. In 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised the people of Manipur that he would seriously consider replacing AFSPA with a more humane law. He appointed a committee headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy to examine the functioning of the law; and the committee, noting the way in which the law was being abused, suggested its replacement by an amended version of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. In the face of the Defence Ministry's objections, however, the report was quietly shelved. Now, in the wake of the resurgence of mass protest in the Kashmir valley, the central government has once again started making vague promises about amending AFSPA. The time to make these changes is now. Section 4 should be amended to explicitly incorporate the principles of necessity and proportionality and Section 6 must be changed to allow for the prosecution of illegal acts in all cases except where the government is able to convince the courts otherwise. Expedient steps like taking some districts out of the ambit of “declared areas” just won't do.


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There is an intense discussion in the media on the pros and cons of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. Most of the participants are not aware of the provisions of the Act which they want withdrawn from Kashmir and the northeast. The Act empowers the armed forces to search and arrest without a formal warrant. This power is important, because by the time a formal search or arrest warrant is obtained, the suspect would get ample time to make good his escape. That Act also permits an Army NCO to fire at a real or suspected insurgent, without fear of being taken to court. When the right of self-defence is available to all citizens, is it fair to deny the same to the army personnel?

If the demand of Chief Minister Omar Abdullah to withdraw AFSPA from parts of Kashmir is accepted, it will embolden the insurgents and affect the functioning of the forces.

Col. Abhay Rishi (retd.),

New Delhi

If, by withdrawing AFSPA, normality will indeed return to the troubled State of Kashmir, by all means abrogate it. Those who oppose it should guarantee that insurgency and militancy across the country will be sorted out by them with a humane approach.

In the first place, the army should not be called to restore law and order in a State. Let it manage the borders. Let us withdraw AFSPA for one year and see how the States concerned cope.

Lt. Col. Ravindranathan K.V. (retd.),

Palakkad

The army is trained to guard the nation's borders, and to kill the enemies of the nation swiftly and efficiently. The tragedy is that across India, the police forces have been politicised and corrupted beyond redemption. Our politicians at both the Centre and the States, therefore, increasingly turn to the army to perform police duties.

As one who spent the first two decades of my life in Meghalaya and Assam, I can say with confidence that the antipathy of the people of the northeast towards AFSPA is rooted in a simple fact — the army, to them, is the most visible face of mis-governance by the GoI.

R.P. Subramanian,

New Delhi

National security is more important than anything else. When it is ensured, some people may suffer more than others. We hear many citizens complaining of security checks in and outside the country but we hear no such complaint from foreigners.

We enjoy complete freedom. Terrorists and other anti-social forces exploit it. The law-abiding common man is at the receiving end because the police, out of fear of the media and rights activists, hesitate to act against such forces.

Rajan Vairavan,

Thiruvananthapuram

The existence of laws such as AFSPA is deplorable. It shows the inability of our system to address the problems of the masses in a democratic way. It is time AFSPA was repealed. We won our independence through a non-violent struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi. It is a shame that we use severe and inhuman laws against our own people. AFSPA's immediate withdrawal is a sine qua non for the protection and promotion of human rights.

Caste Census

The government's decision to collect caste data in a separate census threatens to nullify the potential benefits of the historic and progressive policy shift towards enumerating caste announced earlier. The Group of Ministers' recommendation to enumerate caste during the house-to-house census enumeration phase in February 2011 and not at the biometric camps was a welcome one. However, the Union Cabinet's present decision to schedule the caste census as “a separate exercise” is deeply disturbing. In its 140 year-history, the census has never collected caste data in a separate exercise.

If caste data collection is done as a stand-alone exercise in June 2011, it will generate only a headcount of castes. It will not be possible to integrate the caste data with the socio-economic, educational and demographic data like literacy, education, marital status, life expectancy, occupation, etc gathered during the census headcount. If all we get is a headcount of castes, then the entire exercise is futile. The main reason to enumerate caste is to enable the distribution of national resources and opportunities to be informed by reliable empirical evidence on the socio-economic levels of different communities now and in future. Without such evidence, all the problems blocking the implementation of social justice policies will remain unsolved.

Other reasons

There are other strong reasons against collecting caste data in a separate census from June 2011. June-September is not a suitable time for conducting a nation-wide census, since summer will be intense in most of India and monsoon will be on in the South. Since schools in most states will have reopened, the 21 lakh teacher-enumerators will not be available. Further, it will not be practically possible to mobilise the gigantic field organisation once again in June, within two months of the close of the census enumeration in February-March 2011. The whole exercise will be patchy and unsatisfactory.

Further, the separate caste census in June 2011 is expected to cost Rs. 2,000 crore as against the entire 2011 Census reported cost of Rs. 2,240 crore. When the caste data can be collected simultaneously in the census enumeration phase without added cost, duplicating this effort at such a high cost and with doubtful success is not the right decision.

If the government does persist with a separate caste census — and we hope it will not — it is imperative that the Office of the Registrar General of India ensures the integration of the caste data with the other indices collected during the census enumeration in February 2011, because only this will allow for correlating the data gathered by the separate caste census with the socio-economic, educational and demographic data collected in Census 2011. But this will still be less than satisfactory since a sizable section of the population (about 20 per cent) will be non-comparable due to shifting dwellings/seasonal migration.

The Cabinet's decision to constitute an Expert Group to “classify the caste/tribe returns after the enumeration of caste” does not address the real concern. A group of empowered real experts is indeed needed to monitor the process of caste enumeration and to safeguard it against possible confusions and derailment, but it should be appointed right now to oversee the entire process of caste enumeration and not merely for tabulating the collected data.

It has been alleged that collecting caste data will “compromise” the “integrity” of the census and “distort” the “population count itself.” The allegation that every family will inflate its numbers just to increase their caste strength is baseless because the census collects full details (including name, sex, education, marital status, occupation, etc) of every member returned and non-existent persons cannot be simply added at will. Further, the legal safeguards as well as verification checks built into the system will prevent the collection of false data. Also, in its experience of collecting and publishing caste data from 1871 till 1931, and the data on the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) from 1951 till 2001, the census has not reported any instance of the numbers being inflated or distorted.

The way out

The collection of caste data can be easily done and without any extra expenditure through the schedule used in the house to house census enumeration in February 2011 by just rewording the column for SC-ST as ‘Caste.' This will straightaway ensure correlation with all the other data and make for quick and simultaneous processing and publication of caste data along with the other 2011 Census tables. The advance enumeration scheduled in the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand in October 2010 can be postponed to the summer of 2011, giving enough time from now till next February to finalise, print and distribute the census schedules and manuals.

The arguments against conducting such a gigantic exercise twice within a few months are so many and so compelling that one wonders how they can be ignored. A separate census for caste in June 2011 cannot be defended in administrative, logistical, or financial terms. If the intended policy benefits of the proposed caste data collection are to be achieved, a decision to effect a course correction is required urgently.

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The central argument in favour of caste enumeration has a plausible ring to it. Given the strong, if complex, correlation between caste and socio-economic status, the exercise seems to offer the promise of yielding relevant data so that social and economic disparities can be more accurately targeted by policy. On closer analysis, the advantage turns out to be largely illusory. In fact, the political demand for reviving the colonial practice of caste enumeration — given up by independent India except for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes — has been driven less by ameliorative ideals than by expediency and self-serving, divisive political agendas. At best, fresh caste enumeration can provide only marginal benefits because, as sociologist Nandini Sundar points out, it holds out only an “illusory promise of formal employment.” The long-term societal benefits of reservation — in terms of making a constitutionally sanctioned statement against social inequality and actually providing educational and economic opportunity to historically and socially disadvantaged or oppressed communities — are there for everyone to see. But with the majority of India's workforce languishing in the informal sector and the state's role in providing jobs declining over the past two decades, it is clear that reservation is becoming less and less potent as a countervailing force.

But the objections to the Cabinet's nod for a “focussed,” standalone house-to-house caste headcount between June and September 2011 are not only political-ideological. They are also practical. As any modern sociologist knows, answers to the question, ‘What is your caste?' can be notoriously variable, subjective, and influenced by contingent factors. Caste has an elusive arithmetic in a country that is home to a staggering number of sub-castes, where caste names vary depending on context (for marriage or for religious rituals), and where the social implications of a caste tag vary from region to region. Any 21st century caste enumeration that relies on self-certification will face the same problem encountered by the colonial censuses — what legal scholar Marc Galanter describes as the “unseemly scramble to use census listings to…inflate numbers for political advantage.” But there is yet another objection, pressed in fact by progressive advocates of caste enumeration in the main census exercise: a standalone headcount of caste will be a “futile” exercise because it will be impossible to integrate it with “the socio-economic, educational and demographic data” gathered during the census headcount (see the statement published in Op-Ed). If such integration is ruled out by the subsequent standalone headcount, then why do it?